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Abstract
In his seminal contribution, Tirole (1985) shows that an overlapping gener-
ations economy may monotonically converges to a steady state with a positive
rational bubble, characterized by the dynamically eﬃcient golden rule. The is-
sue we address is whether this monotonic convergence to an eﬃcient long-run
equilibrium may fail, while the economy experiences persistent endogenous ﬂuc-
tuations around the golden rule. Our explanation leads on the features of the
credit market. We consider a simple overlapping generations model with three
assets: money, capital and a pure bubble (bonds). Collateral matters because
increasing his portfolio in capital and bubble, the household reduces the share of
his consumption paid by cash. From a positive point of view, we show that the
bubbly steady state can be locally indeterminate under arbitrarily small credit
market imperfections and, thereby, persistent expectation-driven ﬂuctuations of
equilibria with (rational) bubbles can arise. From a normative point of view,
monetary policies that are not too expansive, are recommended in order to rule
out the occurrence of sunspot ﬂuctuations and enhance the welfare evaluated at
the steady state.
Keywords: Bubbles, collaterals, indeterminacy, cash-in-advance constraint, over-
lapping generations.
Résumé
Dans son inﬂuente contribution, Tirole (1985) montre qu'une économie à
générations imbriquées peut converger de façon monotone vers un état station-
naire avec une bulle rationnelle, caractérisé par la règle d'or dynamiquement eﬃ-
cace. La question qui nous intéresse est d'étudier si cette convergence monotone
vers un état de long terme eﬃcace peut être remise en cause, l'économie con-
naissant des ﬂuctuations endogènes persistentes autour de la règle d'or. Notre
explication est basée sur les caractéristiques du marché du crédit. Nous consid-
érons un modèle à générations imbriquées simple avec trois actifs : la monnaie,
le capital et une bulle (obligation). Le collatéral joue un rôle parce qu'en aug-
mentant son portefeuille en capital et bulle, le consommateur réduit la part de
sa consommation ﬁnancée par la monnaie. D'un point de vue positif, nous mon-
trons que l'état stationnaire avec bulle peut-être localement indéterminé pour
de faibles imperfections du marché du crédit et, ainsi, des ﬂuctuations dues à la
volatilité des anticipations avec une bulle (rationnelle) peuvent émerger. D'un
point de vue normatif, des politiques monétaires qui ne sont pas trop expan-
sives sont recommendées pour éliminer les ﬂuctuations dues aux anticipations
auto-réalisatrices et augmenter le bien-être à l'état stationnaire.
Mots-clés: Bulles, collatéral, indétermination, contrainte de liquidité, généra-
tions imbriquées.
JEL classiﬁcation: D91, E32, E50.
2
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.04
1 Introduction
" [...] Clearly, sustained low inﬂation implies less uncertainty about the future,
and lower risk premiums imply higher prices of stocks and other earning assets.
We can see that in the inverse relationship exhibited by price/earnings ratios
and the rate of inﬂation in the past. But how do we know when irrational
exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to
unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past
decade? [...] " A. Greenspan, 1996.
These controversial words by Alan Greenspan, namely "irrational exuber-
ance", have driven us to deepen the meaning of exuberance and focus on the
existence and persistence of rational instead of irrational exuberance. In the
following, we tackle this issue in a precise sense, by characterizing the existence
of persistent expectation-driven ﬂuctuations of a rational bubble.
The overlapping generations model provides an appropriate dynamic general
equilibrium framework to prove the existence of rational bubbles. As shown
by Tirole (1982, 1985), bubbles arise because agents are short-lived and have
ﬁnite horizon.1 In his seminal paper, Tirole (1985) explains that the existence
of a bubbly steady state requires the coexistence of a dynamically ineﬃcient
bubbleless steady state. In addition, he proves that a unique equilibrium path
converges monotonically to the eﬃcient bubbly steady state.
Rational exuberance can be interpreted as exuberance of rational bubbles
and exuberance, in turn, as volatility of expectations. This explains why we are
interested in showing that rational bubbles can experience persistent expectation-
driven ﬂuctuations in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Moreover, we em-
phasize that the occurrence of such endogenous ﬂuctuations rests on the features
of credit market.
We extend the overlapping generations model proposed by Tirole (1985),
where consumers save through assets representing productive capital and a pure
bubble (bonds), by introducing money as a third asset. Money is needed for
transactions as a mean of exchange:2 a share of second-period consumption in
a two-period life is paid by cash;3 the rest is ﬁnanced on non-monetary sav-
ings or credit (capital and bonds). An additional novel feature of the model
is the assumption that the credit share of consumption purchases grows with
the amount of non-monetary savings. This comes from a simple observation:
because of public regulation or banking practices based on credit market imper-
fections such as asymmetric informations, a consumer owning more collaterals
1See also Tirole (1990) for an introductory survey.
2In our model, in contrast to several contributions (among the others, Michel and Wigniolle
(2003, 2005) and Weil (1987)), the bubble is not purely monetary. On the one hand, real
balances are valued because of their liquidity services and we focus on equilibria where the
cash-in-advance constraint is binding. On the other hand, the bubble is a positive-priced bond
with no fundamental value.
3See, in particular, Hahn and Solow (1995). The interested reader can refer to Crettez et
al. (1999) who present various cash-in-advance constraints in overlapping generations model
with capital accumulation à la Diamond.
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(capital and bonds) can increase her/his credit opportunities and the corre-
sponding share of consumption. Notice also that this goes in opposite direction
of market distortions: the larger the collaterals, the lower the rationing degree
on credit market.
Before characterizing the indeterminacy of the bubbly steady state, which
corresponds to the golden rule, we study its properties, in particular the role of
monetary policy. We show that a decrease in the money growth rate is welfare
improving at the steady state.
Studying the local dynamics, we show that, under a constant credit share, the
bubbly steady state is always determinate, but endogenous cycles of period two
can emerge. Conversely, when collateral matters and the credit share increases
with non-monetary savings, endogenous cycles may not only emerge, but the
bubbly steady state can be indeterminate. In this case, persistent expectation-
driven ﬂuctuations of the rational bubble emerge, founding rational exuberance
on a theoretical ground. It is also worthwhile to notice that these ﬂuctuations
appear for arbitrarily small distortions in the credit market4 and are essentially
explained by the opposite dynamic patterns for real balances and non-monetary
savings. Finally, it is important to notice that a not too expansive monetary
policy rules out indeterminacy, while as seen above it increases the stationary
level of welfare.5
This issue of ﬂuctuations of a rational bubble has been addressed in a few
previous works. Weil (1987) shows the existence of sunspot equilibria, where
the bubble can burst with positive probability. However, his analysis is based
on a Markovian transition matrix, where probabilities are exogenous, and is
inappropriate to explain persistent ﬂuctuations of the bubble. In Azariadis and
Reichlin (1996), endogenous ﬂuctuations of the bubble (debt) may occur through
a Hopf bifurcation. However, in contrast to our result, their analysis requires
suﬃciently large increasing returns,6 i.e. strong market imperfections. Finally,
Michel and Wigniolle (2003, 2005) provide an alternative history for bubbly
ﬂuctuations. Cycles between a bubbly regime (in terms of real balances) and
a regime where the cash-in-advance constraint is binding are exhibited. Hence,
ﬂuctuations occurs, but in contrast to our ﬁndings, the bubble does not persist
along the whole dynamic path.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
model, while, in Section 3, we deﬁne the intertemporal equilibrium. Section 4 is
devoted to study the bubbly regime. In Section 5, we show the indeterminacy
of a bubbly steady state. Section 6 concludes the paper, while many technical
details are gathered in the Appendix.
4We mean a credit share close to one jointly with a small elasticity of the credit share with
respect to non-monetary savings.
5Such a policy recommendation is in contrast to Michel and Wigniolle (2005) where a
suﬃciently expansive monetary creation avoids ﬂuctuations between a regime with a bubble
and a regime with a binding cash-in-advance constraint.
6Indeed, the real interest rate has to be increasing in capital.
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2 The model
We consider an overlapping generations model with two-period lived households
in discrete time, t = 0, 1, ...,+∞.
2.1 Households
At period t, Nt individuals are born. Every one consumes an amount c1t of ﬁnal
good and supplies inelastically one unit of labor when young, and consumes c2t+1
when old. Population growth is constant, n ≡ Nt+1/Nt > 0.
In order to ensure the consumption during the retirement age, people save
through a diversiﬁed portfolio of nominal balances Mt+1, bonds Bt+1 and pro-
ductive capitalKt+1.7 Bonds are remunerated at an interest rate, capital is used
by ﬁrms to produce the consumption good, while money demand is rationalized
by a cash-in-advance constraint in the second period of life. In the following, pt
will denote the price of consumption good, it+1 and rt+1 the rental factors on
bonds and capital, respectively, and wt the real wage.
Preferences are summarized by a Cobb-Douglas utility function in consump-
tion of both periods:
U (c1t, c2t+1) ≡ c1tac1−a2t+1 (1)
with a ∈ (0, 1).
The representative household of a generation born at time t derives con-
sumption and assets demands (money, bonds and capital), by maximizing the
utility function (1) under the ﬁrst and second-period budget constraints:
Mt+1
ptNt
+
Bt+1
ptNt
+
Kt+1
Nt
+ c1t ≤ τt + wt (2)
c2t+1 ≤ Mt+1
pt+1Nt
+ it+1
Bt+1
pt+1Nt
+ rt+1
Kt+1
Nt
(3)
where τt = (Mt+1 −Mt) / (ptNt) are the monetary transfers distributed to
young households. In addition, at the second period of life, each consumer
faces a cash-in-advance constraint:
[1− γ (st)] pt+1c2t+1 ≤ Mt+1
Nt
(4)
where st represents the non-monetary savings:
st ≡ Bt+1
ptNt
+
Kt+1
Nt
When the cash-in-advance constraint is binding, a share 1− γ (s) ∈ (0, 1) of
consumption purchases has to be paid cash.8 The remaining part γ (s) can be
7We assume a full capital depreciation within a period.
8We take in account a criticism addressed to the cash-in-advance literature: money velocity
1/ [1− γ (s)] is endogenous and no longer constant.
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paid at the end of the period and denotes the credit share, that is the fraction of
consumption good bought on credit. Individual non-monetary savings st works
as collateral in order to reduce the need of cash, i.e. the larger the collaterals,
the easier the purchasing on credit.9
The shape of credit share γ can be viewed as a restriction due to lenders' or
sellers' prudential attitude towards borrowers in presence of asymmetric infor-
mations, but also as a credit market regulation policy, that is a legal constraint
to credit grants in order to ensure borrowers' solvability.
Assumption 1 γ (s) ∈ (0, 1) is a continuous function deﬁned on [0,+∞), C2
on (0,+∞) and strictly increasing (γ′ (s) > 0). In addition, we deﬁne:
η1 (s) ≡ γ
′ (s) s
γ (s)
, η2 (s) ≡ γ
′′ (s) s
γ′ (s)
(5)
ηη (s) ≡ η
′
1 (s) s
η1 (s)
= 1− η1 (s) + η2 (s)
We note that when η1 (s) = 0 and γ tends to 1, money is no longer needed
and the credit market distortion disappears. Our framework collapses in the
seminal model by Tirole (1985).
Deﬁning the inﬂation factor as pit+1 ≡ pt+1/pt, we get a no-arbitrage condi-
tion as portfolio choice:
it+1 = pit+1rt+1 (6)
Introducing the variables per capita mt ≡ Mt/ (ptNt), bt ≡ Bt/ (ptNt) and
kt ≡ Kt/Nt, constraints (2)-(4) write:
npit+1mt+1 + st + c1t ≤ τt + wt (7)
c2t+1 ≤ nmt+1 + rt+1st (8)
[1− γ (st)] c2t+1 ≤ nmt+1 (9)
where now
st = n (kt+1 + pit+1bt+1) (10)
Each household maximizes (1) under the budget and cash-in-advance con-
straints (7)-(9), determines an optimal portfolio (mt+1, st) and an optimal con-
sumption plan (c1t, c2t+1).10
Assumption 2 Let ωt+1 ≡ st/ (st + npit+1mt+1). For all t ≥ 0, we assume
it > 1 and
η1 (st) <
1− γ (st)
γ (st)
ωt+1
1− ωt+1 (11)
9In fact, we extend the cash-in-advance constraint proposed by Hahn and Solow (1995) to
the case where the share of consumption when old paid by cash depends on non-monetary
savings.
10We observe that households are aware of the credit share function and consider its argu-
ment s as a choice variable.
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In contrast to Michel and Wigniolle (2003, 2005), we consider only a binding
cash-in-advance constraint.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 2, constraints (7)-(9) are binding.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In order to ensure the diﬀerent constraints to be binding, we assume that
money is a dominated asset, that is rt+1 > 1/pit+1 or, equivalently, it+1 > 1. The
opportunity cost of holding money, that is the nominal interest rate it+1 − 1,
is supposed to be strictly positive. Moreover, inequality (11) puts an upper
bound to the credit-share elasticity η1 (s). In fact, if collaterals matter too
much, people no longer hold money and the cash-in-advance constraint fails to
be binding.
Let Rst+1 ≡ rt+1 − γ′ (st) c2t+1 and Rmt+1 ≡ 1/pit+1 − γ′ (st) c2t+1. Under
Assumption 2, solving the optimal households' behavior, we get:
U1 (c1t, c2t+1)
U2 (c1t, c2t+1)
=
1
pit+1
Rst+1
γ (st)Rmt+1 + [1− γ (st)]Rst+1
>
1
pit+1
(12)
where the last inequality holds because money is a dominated asset (Rmt+1 <
Rst+1).11 We further note that under a constant credit share (γ (s) = γ), equa-
tion (12) rewrites:
U1 (c1t, c2t+1)
U2 (c1t, c2t+1)
=
rt+1
1 + (1− γ) (it+1 − 1)
While the left-hand side is a marginal rate of intertemporal substitution, the
right-hand side would reduce to rt+1 when γ tends to 1, as in the non-monetary
model by Diamond (1965). In the limit case, there is no market distortion.
When γ < 1, money demand entails an opportunity cost which lowers the real
return on portfolio. More precisely, the household has to pay cash 1 − γ to
consume an extra-unit when old. The interest rate it+1 − 1 on the cash hold-
ing entails an opportunity cost (1− γ) (it+1 − 1) which reduces the purchasing
power of non-monetary saving. Further, when the credit share depends on col-
laterals, the marginal impact of savings on the credit share (γ′ (s) > 0) becomes
an additional distortion.
2.2 Firms
A competitive representative ﬁrm produces the ﬁnal good using the constant
returns to scale technology f (K/N)N , where the intensive production function
f (k) satisﬁes:
11Second order conditions are derived in the Appendix. We show that they are satisﬁed for
η2(s) ≤ 2(η1(s)− 1) or η1(s) suﬃciently low.
7
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.04
Assumption 3 f (k) is a continuous function deﬁned on [0,+∞) and C2 on
(0,+∞), strictly increasing (f ′ (k) > 0) and strictly concave (f ′′ (k) < 0). We
further assume limk→0+ f ′ (k) > n > limk→+∞ f ′ (k).
As usual, the competitive ﬁrm takes the prices as given and maximizes the
proﬁt f (Kt/Nt)Nt − wtNt − rtKt:
rt = f ′ (kt) ≡ r (kt) (13)
wt = f (kt)− ktf ′ (kt) ≡ w (kt)
For further reference, α (k) ≡ f ′ (k) k/f (k) ∈ (0, 1) will denote the capital
share in total income and σ (k) ≡ [f ′ (k) k/f (k)− 1] f ′ (k) / [kf ′′ (k)] > 0 the
elasticity of capital-labor substitution. The interest rate and wage elasticities
depend on α (k) and σ (k):
εr (k) ≡ r
′ (k) k
r(k)
= −1− α (k)
σ (k)
(14)
εw (k) ≡ w
′ (k) k
w(k)
=
α (k)
σ (k)
2.3 Monetary policy
A simple monetary policy is considered: money grows at a constant rate,
Mt+1/Mt = µ > 0. Focusing on real variables, we can decompose the money
growth in the product of demographic growth, inﬂation and economic growth:
µ = npit+1mt+1/mt (15)
According to the Friedman's metaphor, money is helicoptered to young con-
sumers by the monetary authority through lump-sum transfers τt = (Mt+1 −Mt)
/ (ptNt) or, in real terms:
τt = npit+1mt+1 −mt (16)
2.4 Bonds
Bonds follow Bt+1 = itBt.12 Using real variables per capita, we get:
itbt = npit+1bt+1 (17)
Because they have zero intrinsic (fundamental) value, bonds are pure bub-
bles.
12For instance, one can assume that this asset is supplied by the government. bt can be
considered as a (real) engagement to repay bt unit of consumption, whatever the price pt.
Alternatively, Bt can be interpreted as the (monetary) price of a quantity of asset normalized
to one. In both the cases, Bt is a non-predetermined variable.
8
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3 Equilibrium
Substituting (16) in the ﬁrst-period budget constraint (7), we ﬁnd:
mt + st + c1t = w (kt) (18)
where mt represents the individual demand for real balances. 13 Using (8) and
(9), we obtain:
mt+1 = st
r (kt+1)
n
1− γ (st)
γ (st)
(19)
c2t+1 = r (kt+1)
st
γ (st)
(20)
Replacing (19) into (15), we deduce the inﬂation factor:
pit+1 =
µ
n
γ (st)
γ (st−1)
1− γ (st−1)
1− γ (st)
r (kt) st−1
r (kt+1) st
(21)
>From these expressions, we derive two equations that determine the dy-
namics of the economy. On the one side, from (12), (20) and (21), the consumers'
intertemporal trade-oﬀ writes:
xt+1 =
1− a
a
[1− η1 (st)] str (kt+1)
γ (st) st + µ [1− γ (st)− η1 (st)] st−1 r(kt)n γ(st)1−γ(st)
1−γ(st−1)
γ(st−1)
(22)
where
xt+1 ≡ c2t+1
c1t
=
str (kt+1) /γ (st)
w (kt)− st − st−1 r(kt)n 1−γ(st−1)γ(st−1)
(23)
is obtained from (18), (19) and (20).14 On the other side, combining (6), (10)
and (17) gives:
r (kt) (st−1 − nkt) = n (st − nkt+1) (24)
Markets clear over time when these equations holds. More precisely:
Deﬁnition 1 An intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight is a sequence
(st−1, kt) ∈ R2++, t = 0, 1, ...,+∞, such that (22)-(24) are satisﬁed, given k0 =
K0/N0 > 0.
13Note that aggregating (8) and (18), and substituting (10) and (17), we recover the equi-
librium in the goods market:
c1t + c2t/n+ nkt+1 = r (kt) kt + w (kt) = f (kt)
14The positivity of the right-hand side of (22) is ensured by (11) (see the proof of Lemma
1). Hence, xt+1, solution of (22), will be also positive at equilibrium.
9
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Equations (22)-(24) constitute a two-dimensional dynamic system which de-
termines from the initial condition the equilibrium path (st−1, kt)t≥0, where
only kt is a predetermined variable.
Let us notice that, using the deﬁnition of ωt+1 and substituting (19) into
(11), we get η1 (st) < 1/it+1. Hence, at equilibrium, Assumption 2 implies:
1 < it+1 < 1/η1 (st) (25)
for t = 0, 1, ...,+∞.
4 Steady state analysis
A steady state is a solution (s, k) ∈ R2++ that satisﬁes:
x =
1− a
a
(1− η1 (s)) r (k)
γ (s) + µ (1− γ (s)− η1 (s)) r (k) /n (26)
with
x =
r (k)
γ (s) (w(k)/s− 1)− (1− γ (s)) r (k) /n
and15
r (k) (s− nk) = n (s− nk) (27)
By direct inspection of equation (27), we deduce that two steady states may
coexist, the one without bubble (bubbleless steady state), where s = nk, and
the one with a bubble (bubbly steady state), where s > nk.
For the sake of brevity, we will omit the characterization of the former.
Indeed, the novelty of the paper mainly rests on the role of monetary policy
and credit market regulation16 on the level of the bubble and the occurrence of
persistent ﬂuctuations of the bubble.
Using (26) and (27), a steady state with s > nk is a solution (s, k) ∈ R2++
satisfying:
r (k) = n (28)
a
1− a
ns/γ (s)
w (k)− s/γ (s) =
n [1− η1 (s)]
γ (s) + µ [1− γ (s)− η1 (s)] (29)
Equation (28) determines the capital intensity of golden rule, which, in turn,
determines the wage bill w (k). Replacing w (k) in (29) gives the non-monetary
savings s as a function of the eﬃcient capital intensity.
At the steady state, equation (15) writes µ = npi and gives, together with
equation (17), the Fischer equation of a bubbly regime: i = pin. Therefore,
15Equation (27) is equivalent to r (k) b = nb.
16Recall that the credit share γ(s) summarizes either lenders' habits based on the existence
of asymmetric information about borrowers, or institutional and legal constraints to loans.
10
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according to equation (25), Assumption 2 holds if and only if the monetary
policy is bounded:
1 < µ < 1/η1(s) (30)
In the following, after tackling the issue of the existence of a bubbly steady
state, we will pursue the analysis by studying how money growth and credit
share aﬀect the stationary allocation. We end the section by evaluating the
consequences of monetary policy on welfare.
4.1 Existence
The following assumption is suﬃcient to ensure the existence of a steady state
with a positive bubble:
Assumption 4
aα
γ (nf ′−1 (n)) (1− α)− α <
(1− a) [1− η1 (nf ′−1 (n))]
µ [1− η1 (nf ′−1 (n))]− (µ− 1) γ (nf ′−1 (n))
where α ≡ α (f ′−1 (n)) is the capital share in total income at the golden rule.
The next proposition proves the existence and provides a result on unique-
ness.
Proposition 1 Let s ≡ nf ′−1 (n) and s be deﬁned by w ≡ w (f ′−1 (n)) =
s/γ (s). Under Assumptions 1-4, there exists a steady state characterized by the
golden rule, r (k) = n, and a positive bubble, s ∈ (s, s). Moreover, when γ is
constant, uniqueness of this steady state is ensured.
Proof. See the Appendix.
By continuity, uniqueness of the steady state with bubble is still satisﬁed
when the credit share γ(s) is no longer constant but the elasticity of credit
share η1 (s) remains suﬃciently weak for every s ∈ (s, s).
4.2 Comparative statics under isoelastic credit share
For simplicity, we focus on the case with a constant elasticity of credit share
η1, that is ηη (s) = 0. We start by studying the role of the credit constraint
on non-monetary savings and, then, on the size of the bubble. The following
assumption simpliﬁes the comparative statics to a large extent.
Assumption 5
µ < 1 +
(1− η1)2
η1
1− a
a
w
s
11
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This assumption is not too restrictive. In particular, when we assume a
suﬃciently low η1, to avoid large distortions in the credit market, Assumption
5 is easily satisﬁed.
Under an isoelastic credit share, the following proposition sheds a light on
the structure of the credit market and the eﬀects on the size of the bubble.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1-5 and a constant η1, non-monetary sav-
ings s and the bubble b are both increasing in η1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Under a positive (but not too large) rate of money growth µ−1 (see (30) and
Assumption 5), the more sensitive the credit share to collaterals, the higher the
non-monetary saving. Indeed, under a more elastic credit share, increasing s re-
sults in a larger amount on the right-hand side of the cash-in-advance constraint
c2 ≤ nm/[1 − γ(s)]. Future consumption c2 is allowed to rise. This, in turn,
promotes and reinforces the initial rise of s. Since η1 aﬀects neither the capital-
labor ratio, nor the inﬂation, the more sensitive credit share to collaterals also
increases the size of the bubble.
To understand the role of the credit share on non-monetary savings, we fur-
ther assume a constant credit share: η1 = 0. Under a positive monetary growth
(µ > 1), γ has an unambiguously positive eﬀect on the non-monetary savings
s through the positive impact on their bubbly part b.17 Indeed, households are
required to hold less cash, enlarging the non-monetary part in total savings.
Since capital intensity is ﬁxed by the golden rule (r(k) = n), the non-monetary
savings are forced to grow through a larger bubble.
Even if in presence of bubbles, because of the golden rule, the monetary pol-
icy fails to aﬀect the capital-labor ratio, the non-monetary savings are actually
modiﬁed by the money growth because of its eﬀect on the bubble. Under the
terms of Assumption 5, the following proposition explains the role of monetary
policy on saving behavior.
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1-5 and a constant η1, non-monetary sav-
ings s are decreasing in µ if and only if η1 < 1− γ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
A higher µ increases the inﬂation rate and the nominal interest rate, i.e. the
opportunity cost of holding money. This reduces the demand of real balances.
When the credit share is little sensitive to collaterals (η1 < 1 − γ), the cash-
in-advance constraint lowers the future consumption which, according to the
17When γ is constant, we can replace η1 = 0 in (29) and diﬀerentiate with respect to γ and
s. Under µ > 1, we ﬁnd a positive elasticity:
ds
dγ
γ
s
=
1 + a (µ− 1)
1 + a (µ− 1) (1− γ) > 0
At the steady state, savings are linear in the bubble: s = µb+ nf ′−1 (n), and we obtain also
a positive eﬀect on the bubble: db/dγ = (ds/dγ) /µ > 0.
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budget constraint, requires less non-monetary saving (εsµ < 0). Conversely,
if credit market sensitivity to collaterals becomes large enough (η1 > 1 − γ),
individuals can reduce the burden of cash-in-advance by purchasing collaterals
(εsµ > 0), so oﬀsetting the increase of nominal interest rate.18
It is also of interest to see how the (real) bubble b adjusts in response to a
change of money growth. We can show that:
Corollary 1 Under Assumptions 1-5 and a constant η1, the (real) bubble b is
decreasing in µ if η1 < 1− γ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
When η1 < 1 − γ, a higher rate of money growth reduces the size of the
(real) bubble because it lowers non-monetary saving, but also because inﬂation
rises. If η1 > 1 − γ, a more expansive monetary policy can increase the size
of the (real) bubble if the increase of non-monetary savings is suﬃciently large.
This occurs if, for instance, the credit share γ is suﬃciently low.
4.3 Welfare
We conclude the steady state analysis by focusing on the role of monetary policy
on consumers' welfare.
In the bubbly regime, as seen above, the capital intensity k of golden rule no
longer depends on the monetary policy, whereas non-monetary savings s and,
therefore, consumptions (when young and old) are aﬀected by the choice of µ.
More explicitly, c1 and c2 write:
c1 = f (k)− nk − s
γ (s)
(31)
c2 = n
s
γ (s)
(32)
At the steady state, the individual welfare level is given by W = U (c1, c2).
Let:
µ1 ≡ γ
η1 − (1− γ)
µ2 ≡ 1 + 1− η11− η1 + ηη
(1− η1)2
η1
1− a
a
w
s
After some computations, we obtain:19
εWµ = εUc2
µ
γ
1− η1
η1
1− η1
1− η1 + ηη
µ− 1
µ− µ1
1− γ − η1
µ− µ2 (33)
18This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that the consumption ratio (x ≡ c2/c1)
is increasing with respect to s (see the proof of Proposition 3). Therefore, the consumption
ratio decreases (increases) with µ when η1 < 1− γ (η1 > 1− γ).
19The welfare elasticity (33) is derived in the Appendix.
13
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.04
To characterize the welfare adjustment to the monetary policy, we further
assume:20
Assumption 6 ηη > η1 − 1.
In the next proposition, we highlight the welfare consequences of money
growth (µ > 1) depending on the credit market features.
Proposition 4 Let Assumptions 1-4 and 6 be satisﬁed.
1. When η1 < 1 − γ, the welfare W is decreasing for 1 < µ < µ2 and
increasing for µ > µ2;
2. When η1 > 1 − γ, the welfare W is decreasing for 1 < µ < min {µ1, µ2},
increasing for min {µ1, µ2} < µ < max {µ1, µ2}, and decreasing again for
µ > max {µ1, µ2}.
In the limit case where µ = 1, the welfare W attains a local maximum.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We know that a variation of µ induces a decrease or an increase of non-
monetary savings s depending on the magnitude of η1 relatively to 1 − γ (see
Proposition 3). Moreover, by direct inspection of (31) and (32), we see that
consumption demands c1 and c2 are, respectively, decreasing and increasing in
s. Hence, when η1 < 1−γ and µ is not too large, a higher rate of money growth,
lowering non-monetary savings, results in a negative eﬀect on welfare through
the dominant contraction of second-period consumption. On the contrary, when
η1 > 1 − γ and µ is not too large, welfare decreases with the money growth
rate, because the rise of non-monetary savings comes from a lower ﬁrst-period
consumption with a dominant impact on welfare.
In any case, it is important to notice that, starting with a money growth
rate which is not too large, decreasing µ is welfare improving.
Eventually, we observe that, in the limit case where µ tends to 1, credit
market distortions no longer aﬀect the consumer's choice. We recover on the one
hand the Friedman rule (i = npi = 1) and, on the other hand, the intertemporal
trade-oﬀ of a Diamond (1965) model without cash-in-advance corresponding to
the golden rule, i.e. U1 (c1, c2) /U2 (c1, c2) = r = n (see equation (26)).
5 Sunspot bubbles
Let us show the existence of sunspot bubbles, that is, multiple equilibria that
converge to a steady state with a positive rational bubble. In order to ad-
dress the issue, we will show that the steady state with a positive bubble can be
locally indeterminate and, therefore, there is room for expectation-driven ﬂuctu-
ations of the bubble, without any shock on the fundamentals. Collaterals visibly
20The isoelastic case (ηη = 0) satisﬁes Assumption 6.
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matter. Indeed, when the credit share is constant, the steady state is always
determinate, while, when it depends on non-monetary savings, indeterminacy
can arise under arbitrarily weak market distortions.
We start by linearizing the dynamic system (22)-(24) around the steady state
with a positive bubble21 and we obtain a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 2 Let
Z1 ≡ (1− γ − η1)
[
1− a
a
+ µ
1− γ − η1
(1− γ) (1− η1)
]
(34)
Z2 ≡ γ
[
µ− 1
1− η1
(
1 + η1 +
η1
1− η1 η2
)
− µ 1− γ − η
2
1
(1− γ) (1− η1) −
1− a
a
]
(35)
Z3 ≡ 1− a
a
(
1 + η1
1− y
y
)
+ µ
1− η1 − γ
1− η1
(
1 +
η1
1− γ
1− y
y
)
(36)
where the capital share in total non-monetary saving y ≡ rk/ (rk + ib) = nk/s ∈
(0, 1] and the credit market features γ ≡ γ (s), η1 ≡ η1 (s) and η2 ≡ η2 (s), are
all evaluated at the steady state.
Under Assumptions 1-4, the characteristic polynomial, evaluated at a steady
state with a positive bubble (r (k) = n, y ∈ (0, 1)), writes P (X) ≡ X2 − TX +
D = 0, where:
D =
Z1
Z2
− 1− α
σ
Z3
Z2
≡ D (σ) (37)
T = 1 +D (σ)− 1− α
σ
1− y
y
(
Z1
Z2
− 1
)
≡ T (σ) (38)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Following Grandmont et al. (1998), we characterize the (local) stability
properties of the steady state in the (T,D)-plane (see Figures 1 and 2). More
explicitly, we evaluate the polynomial P (X) ≡ X2 − TX +D = 0 at −1, 0 and
1. Along the line (AC), one eigenvalue is equal to 1, i.e. P (1) = 1−T +D = 0.
Along the line (AB), one eigenvalue is equal to −1, i.e. P (−1) = 1+T +D = 0.
On the segment [BC], the two eigenvalues are complex and conjugate with unit
modulus, i.e. D = 1 and |T | < 2. Therefore, inside the triangle ABC, the
steady state is a sink, i.e. locally indeterminate (D < 1 and |T | < 1 +D). It is
a saddle point if (T,D) lies on the right or left sides of both the lines (AB) and
(AC) (|1 +D| < |T |). It is a source otherwise. Moreover, continuously changing
a parameter of interest, we can follow how (T,D) moves in the (T,D)-plane. A
(local) bifurcation arises when at least one eigenvalue crosses the unit circle, that
is, when the pair (T,D) crosses one of the loci (AB), (AC) or [BC]. According
to the changes of the bifurcation parameter, a pitchfork bifurcation (generically)
21The novelty of the paper concerns dynamics around the bubbly steady state. Thus, for
the sake of conciseness, we omit the analysis of local dynamics in the neighborhood of the
bubbleless steady state.
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occurs when (T,D) goes through (AC),22 a ﬂip bifurcation (generically) arises
when (T,D) crosses (AB), whereas a Hopf bifurcation (generically) emerges
when (T,D) goes through the segment [BC].
-
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Figure 1: Local dynamics when γ is constant
A convenient parameter to discuss the stability of the steady state and the
occurrence of bifurcations in the (T,D)-plane is the elasticity of capital-labor
substitution σ ∈ (0,+∞). When this bifurcation parameter varies, the locus
Σ ≡ {(T (σ) , D (σ)) : σ ≥ 0} describes a half-line with a slope given by:
S =
D′ (σ)
T ′ (σ)
=
Z3
Z3 + (Z1 − Z2) (1− y) /y (39)
We notice also that the endpoint (T (+∞) , D (+∞)) of the half-line Σ is
located on the line (AC) and given by:
D (+∞) = Z1/Z2 and T (+∞) = 1 +D (+∞)
22Indeed, we have shown that there exists at least one steady state and the number of
stationary solutions is generically odd (see Proposition 1).
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Figure 2: Indeterminate bubble
while, the starting point (T (0+) , D (0+)) is such that T (0+) = ±∞ andD (0+) =
±∞, depending on the slope S.
In order to understand the role played by collaterals, we start by considering
the case of a constant credit share: η1 = η2 = 0. Using equations (34)-(36), we
get:
Z1
Z2
=−1− γ
γ
(aµ+ 1− a) < 0 and Z3
Z2
= −1− γ
γ
(
aµ+
1− a
1− γ
)
< 0
Hence, the slope S belongs to (0, 1) and D (σ) is decreasing. This also means
that T (0+) = +∞ and D (0+) = +∞. Moreover, since D (+∞) = Z1/Z2 < 0,
(T (+∞) , D (+∞)) is on the line (AC) below the horizontal axis. Let:
γ˜ ≡ 1 + a (µ− 1)
2 + a (µ− 1) ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
(40)
We easily deduce that for γ ∈ (γ˜, 1), D (+∞) > −1, whereas for γ ∈ (0, γ˜),
D (+∞) < −1. Therefore, for γ ∈ (γ˜, 1), the half-line Σ is below (AC) and
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above (AB). For γ ∈ (0, γ˜), Σ is still below (AC) but crosses (AB) at σ = σF ,
with:23
σF ≡ (1− α)
[
aµ (1− γ) + 1− a
(aµ+ 1− a) (1− γ)− γ +
1
2
1− y
y
(aµ+ 1− a) (1− γ) + γ
(aµ+ 1− a) (1− γ)− γ
]
(41)
Using these geometrical results, we deduce the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Let γ˜ be deﬁned by (40), σF by (41), γ be constant and η1 =
η2 = 0. Under Assumptions 1-4, the following generically holds.
(i) When γ ∈ (γ˜, 1), the bubbly steady state is a saddle for all σ > 0.
(ii) When γ ∈ (0, γ˜), the bubbly steady state is a saddle for 0 < σ < σF ,
undergoes a ﬂip bifurcation at σ = σF and becomes a source for σ > σF .
On the one side, when the credit share γ is constant, there is no room for
local indeterminacy and expectation-driven ﬂuctuations are ruled out. When
γ is suﬃciently large, the bubbly steady state is a saddle for all degrees of
capital-labor substitution. This result is similar to Tirole (1985), we recover by
taking the limit case as γ tends to 1. In contrast, when γ is weaker and the
capital-labor substitution becomes large enough, the bubbly steady state looses
the saddle-path stability through the occurrence of cycles of period two.24
On the other side, assuming a credit share sensitive to collaterals (η1 6= 0,
η2 6= 0) can entail serious eﬀects on the stability properties. More precisely,
not only we will show that the steady state may be locally indeterminate and
expectations-driven ﬂuctuations of the (rational) bubble may occur, but also
that such ﬂuctuations appear under arbitrarily weak market distortions, that
is, η1 close to zero and γ close to one.
In order to get local indeterminacy, we require the half-line Σ to enter the
triangle ABC (see Figure 2). More explicitly, D (σ) > T (σ)− 1 is a necessary
condition to be inside ABC. Using (37) and (38), this inequality is equivalent
to Z1/Z2 > 1, but this implies that (T (+∞) , D (+∞)) lies on the line (AC)
above the point C. Hence, Σ goes through ABC and local indeterminacy arises
if the following two conditions are met:
1. D(σ) is increasing;
2. SB < S < 1, where SB ≡ (Z1 − Z2) / (Z1 + 3Z2) ∈ (0, 1) is the value of
the slope S such that the half-line Σ goes through the point B.
23The critical value σF solves D (σF ) = −T (σF )− 1.24Conversely, in a cash-in-advance Ramsey model where 1 − γ denotes the consumption
share holding real balances, dynamics are three-dimensional and indeterminacy arises for
suﬃciently large γ (close to one) whatever the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, while
one-dimensional saddle-path stability prevails for smaller credit shares (see Bosi and Magris
(2003) for details). As we shall see, we obtain closely related results in our overlapping
generations model when the credit share is no more constant.
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Notice that D′ (σ) > 0 is equivalent to Z3/Z2 > 0, which, together with
Z1/Z2 > 1, ensures that 0 < S < 1. In addition, Z3/Z2 > 0 and Z1/Z2 > 1
imply T (0+) = −∞ and D (0+) = −∞.
All these geometrical results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Let
σF ≡ (1− α)
2Z3 + (Z1 − Z2) 1−yy
2 (Z1 + Z2)
σH ≡ (1− α) Z3
Z1 − Z2
be the critical values of the capital-labor substitution such that D (σF ) = −T (σF )−
1 and D(σH) = 1, respectively.
Under Assumptions 1-4, the steady state with a positive bubble is locally
indeterminate if the conditions (i) Z1/Z2 > 1, (ii) Z3/Z2 > 0 and (iii) S >
(Z1 − Z2) / (Z1 + 3Z2) are satisﬁed, where Z1, Z2, Z3 are given by (34)-(36),
and S by (39).
In this case, local indeterminacy occurs for σ ∈ (σF , σH). Generically, the
steady state undergoes a ﬂip bifurcation at σ = σF and a Hopf bifurcation at
σ = σH .
We remark that, since 0 < σF < σH < +∞, there is no room for a locally in-
determinate bubble when the production factors are either too weak substitutes
(σ suﬃciently close to zero) or too large substitutes (σ high enough).
In order to provide an intuition of Proposition 6, we need to write conditions
(i)-(iii) in terms of those structural parameters that capture the peculiarities
of the model. Since we are interested in the eﬀects of monetary policy and the
credit market distortions, it is appropriate to focus on the money growth rate
µ and the credit market features (γ, η1, η2).
Let us introduce the following critical values:
µ ≡ 1− γ
η1
1 + η1 + (1− η1) 1−aa
1 + η1 − γ
µ ≡ 1 +
[
a
(
γ
1− η1
1 + η1
1− η1 − 1
)]−1
θ1 ≡ −1− η
2
1
η1
[
1− 1− η1
1 + η1
(
1 +
1
a +
µη1
1−η1
1−γ−η1
1−γ
µ− 1
)]
θ2 ≡ −1− η
2
1
η1
[
1− 1− η1
1 + η1
(
1 +
1
a − M1−η1
µ− 1
)
1− η1
γ
]
where
M ≡ 2Z3 y1− y
(√
1 +
Z1
Z3
1− y
y
− 1
)
(42)
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Let us put additional restrictions to ﬁnd suitable conditions for local inde-
terminacy.
Assumption 7 γ < 1− η1 and µ < µ < µ.
In order to show that there is a nonempty subset P0 of the parameter
space, satisfying Assumption 7, we observe that, when γ lies in a left neigh-
borhood of 1 − η1, we have 0 < µ < µ. Indeed, limγ→1−η1
(
µ− µ) = 0 and
∂
(
µ− µ) /∂γ∣∣
γ=1−η1 = − (1− a) / (2aη1) < 0 imply that the interval
(
µ, µ
)
becomes nonempty as soon as γ decreases from 1− η1.
To prove that a nonempty subset P1 ⊆ P0 meets also Assumption 2, we
require inequalities (30) to hold when µ ∈ (µ, µ). This happens for η1 suﬃciently
close to zero because 1 < µ, and µ < 1/η1. Finally, there exists a nonempty
subset P2 ⊆ P1 where the second-order conditions for utility maximization are
veriﬁed: consider, for instance, arbitrarily weak credit market imperfections,
that is, a suﬃciently low elasticity η1 and a suﬃciently large γ (say, close to
one).
Proposition 6 can be now revisited regarding the credit market features:
Proposition 7 Under Assumption 7, the conditions (i)-(iii) of Proposition 6
are satisﬁed if
max {θ1, θ2} < η2 (43)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The proof of Proposition 7 shows also that max {θ1, θ2} is negative and, so,
the admissible interval for the second-order elasticity of credit share η2 admits
negative values, provided that µ > µ is suﬃciently close to µ.
This proposition shows that, when collaterals matter (η1 6= 0), endogenous
cycles can occur not only through a ﬂip bifurcation (cycle of period 2) but also
through a Hopf bifurcation, which promotes the emergence of an invariant closed
curve around the steady state.
Moreover, the steady state can be locally indeterminate: expectation-driven
ﬂuctuations of the bubble can arise around the (bubbly) steady state. Following
Greenspan's words, agents' rational exuberance is interpreted as a volatility of
rational expectations which drives persistent ﬂuctuations of a rational bubble.
To the best of our knowledge, this result is new and rests on the existence
of arbitrarily small market distortions, i.e. a suﬃciently low elasticity of credit
share (η1 close to zero) together with large credit opportunities (γ close to one)).
Furthermore, local indeterminacy requires intermediate values of the elastic-
ity of capital-labor substitution, neither too low nor too high (see Proposition
6). So, usual speciﬁcations of technology becomes compatible with the exis-
tence of multiple equilibria. Namely, a Cobb-Douglas technology is represented
by a unit elasticity and local indeterminacy requires σF < 1 < σH , which is
equivalent to:
Z1 − Z2
1− α < Z3 <
Z1 + Z2
1− α −
1
2
1− y
y
(Z1 − Z2) (44)
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The right-hand (left-hand) inequality in (44) corresponds to σF < 1 (1 <
σH). The right-hand inequality is satisﬁed for an appropriate choice of η2, while
the left-hand inequality is satisﬁed for η1 suﬃciently close to 1− γ.
Finally, we notice that Proposition 7 has also some implications for the
monetary policy. Indeed, indeterminacy requires µ < µ < µ (Assumption 7).
Therefore, choosing a money growth factor µ higher than µ or lower than µ
rules out expectation-driven ﬂuctuations. We argue however, that choosing µ
smaller than µ and even suﬃciently close to 1 is better. Indeed, in such a
case, the monetary authority does not only stabilize ﬂuctuations due to self-
fulﬁlling expectations, but also improves consumers' welfare at the steady state
(see Proposition 4). We notice also that this result is in contrast to Michel
and Wigniolle (2005) where a suﬃciently expansive monetary creation is recom-
mended to avoid ﬂuctuations of the economy switching between a regime with
a bubble and a regime with a binding cash-in-advance constraint.
5.1 Economic intuition
First, we will give a story for bubbly cycles of period two based on the emer-
gence of non-monotonic trajectories (Proposition 5). Then, we will provide an
economic interpretation for the occurrence of local indeterminacy, that is the
existence of sunspot bubbles or rational exuberance (Proposition 6).
We start with the case where the credit share γ is constant (η1 = 0), but
strictly smaller than one. Assuming a decrease of the capital stock kt from its
steady state value, the real wage wt becomes smaller and the real interest rate
rt higher. When the elasticity of capital-labor substitution is not too weak, this
induces a lower level of rtst−1. Since, using equation (19), we have:
mt = rtst−1
1
n
1− γ
γ
(45)
real money balancesmt decreases. As a direct implication, we also get a decrease
of pit+1mt+1 (see equation (15)).
Using now (22) and (23) with γ constant and η1 = 0, we obtain:
st = (1− a)wt − (aµ+ 1− a) rtst−1 1
n
1− γ
γ
(46)
Since both wt and rtst−1 decrease, two opposite eﬀects aﬀect savings st. In
particular, we note that the second eﬀect comes from the decrease of money
holding and, obviously, disappears in the limit case where the credit share γ
tends to one.
Assuming that the second eﬀect dominates, savings st increases. Using (21),
we deduce that it+1 = pit+1rt+1 decreases, meaning that the opportunity cost
of holding money is reduced. Therefore, money balances mt+1 increases, which
implies a decrease of inﬂation pit+1 because, as seen above, pit+1mt+1 reduces.
From equation (45), this increase of the real money stock implies a raise of
rt+1st. When capital and labor are not too weak substitutes, capital kt+1
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becomes higher. Since the bubble pit+1bt+1 has the same return, it increases
also.
This explains that, following a decrease of capital from the steady state,
future capital goes in the opposite direction, explaining oscillations. When γ is
constant and not too close to one, we have seen that instability emerges (see
Proposition 5). We argue that this comes from two main eﬀects: the strong
impact of rtst−1 on st (see (46)) and the proportional relationship between
rtst−1 and mt (see (45)).
Conversely, local indeterminacy requires a variable γ closer to one (see
Proposition 7). If, on the one hand the eﬀect of rtst−1 on st is lower (see
(46)), on the other hand the relationship between mt and rtst−1 is no longer
proportional and becomes nonlinear:
mt =
1
n
1− γ (st−1)
γ (st−1)
rtst−1 (47)
Note that the elasticity of [1− γ (s)] /γ (s) with respect to s is equal to
−η1/ (1− γ), which belongs to (−1, 0) and is quite small in absolute value under
Assumption 7. Therefore, when rtst−1 decreases, and st−1 as well, the eﬀect
on mt is dampened. In other words, two crucial channels for the occurrence of
non-monotonic dynamics are weaker when η1 > 0, which provides the intuition
for local stability or indeterminacy of the bubbly steady state when collateral
matters. Finally, we notice that equation (24) rewrites:
pitbtrt = npit+1bt+1 (48)
The oscillations just described above can be sustained by optimistic expecta-
tions on the future value of the bubble pit+1bt+1, meaning that consumers born
in t − 1 will (slightly) increase their share of savings through the bubble pitbt,
which implies an eﬀective increase of the bubble in the next period pit+1bt+1,
since rt also raises.
6 Conclusion
Could market volatility, what Greenspan calls exuberance, be compatible with
agents' rationality? In order to give a positive answer, we extend the Tirole
(1985) model with rational bubbles, to account for credit market imperfections.
We consider an overlapping generations model, where a share of the second-
period consumption is paid by cash, while savings are also used to buy pro-
ductive capital and a pure bubble. Collateral matters because a higher level
of non-monetary savings reduces this share of consumption ﬁnanced by money
balances.
In this framework, we show that the bubbly steady state can be locally in-
determinate because of the role of collateral and, therefore, there is room for
expectation-driven ﬂuctuations of the bubble. We further notice that the ex-
istence of such ﬂuctuations requires arbitrarily small market distortions. We
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ﬁnally recommend the monetary policy to be not too expansive in order to
achieve a twofold objective, that is, to immunize the economy against endoge-
nous ﬂuctuations and to improve the welfare level (evaluated at the steady
state).
All these results concern equilibria where money is a dominated asset and
the cash-in-advance constraint is always binding. In a simpler model where
collaterals play no role, Michel and Wigniolle (2003, 2005) are able to prove that
the economy can experience cycles by switching between two regimes where,
respectively, the liquidity constraint is binding or fails to hold with equality.
Analyzing such dynamics in our model is left for future research.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We maximize the Lagrangian function:
U (c1t, c2t+1)
+λ1t (τt + wt − npit+1mt+1 − st − c1t)
+λ2t+1 (nmt+1 + rt+1st − c2t+1)
+νt+1 (nmt+1 − [1− γ (st)] c2t+1) (49)
with respect to (mt+1, st, c1t, c2t+1, λ1t, λ2t+1, νt+1). Since λ1t = U1 (c1t, c2t+1) >
0, then (7) becomes binding. Because
λ2t+1 = λ1t
1− pit+1γ′ (st) c2t+1
rt+1 − γ′ (st) c2t+1
νt+1 = λ1t
(
pit+1 − 1− pit+1γ
′ (st) c2t+1
rt+1 − γ′ (st) c2t+1
)
strict positivity of λ2t+1 and νt+1 requires
pit+1 >
1− pit+1γ′ (st) c2t+1
rt+1 − γ′ (st) c2t+1 > 0
or, equivalently,
it+1 >
rt+1 − it+1γ′ (st) c2t+1
rt+1 − γ′ (st) c2t+1 > 0 (50)
Inequality rt+1− it+1γ′ (st) c2t+1 > 0 is equivalent to (11). Moreover, it+1 >
1 implies rt+1 − γ′ (st) c2t+1 > rt+1 − it+1γ′ (st) c2t+1 > 0, which ensures that
both inequalities in (50) hold.
Suﬃcient conditions for utility maximization
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We compute the Hessian matrix of the Lagrangian function (49) with respect
to (λ1t, λ2t+1, νt+1, c1t, c2t+1, st,mt+1):25
H ≡

0 0 0 −1 0 −1 −npi
0 0 0 0 −1 r n
0 0 0 0 γ − 1 c2γ′ n
−1 0 0 U11 U12 0 0
0 −1 γ − 1 U12 U22 νγ′ 0
−1 r c2γ′ 0 νγ′ νc2γ′′ 0
−npi n n 0 0 0 0

In order to get a regular (i.e. strict) local maximum, we need to check the
negative deﬁnition of H over the set of points satisfying the constraints. Let
m and n denote the numbers of constraints and variables, respectively. If the
determinant of H has sign (−1)n and the last n−m diagonal principal minors
have alternating signs, then the optimum is a regular local maximum. In our
case n = 4 and m = 3. Therefore, we simply require detH > 0, that is,
detH = −n2
[
(γ − pi [c2γ′ − r (1− γ)])2 U11
+2 (c2γ′ − r) (γ − pi [c2γ′ − r (1− γ)])U12
+(c2γ′ − r)2 U22
− νγ [2γ′ (c2γ′ − r)− γc2γ′′]] > 0 (51)
Using (9) and (8), we ﬁnd c2t+1/rt+1 = st/γ (st). Substituting in (51) in
order to satisfy (locally) the second order conditions, we require:
detH = − (nr)2
[
ζ0 + ζ21U11 + 2ζ1 (η1 − 1)U12 + (η1 − 1)2 U22
]
= − (nr)2
[
ζ0 +
[
ζ1 η1 − 1
] [ U11 U12
U12 U22
] [
ζ1
η1 − 1
]]
> 0(52)
where
ζ0 = ζ0 ≡ νη1 [η2 + 2 (1− η1)] γ
r
γ
s
ζ1 = ζ1 ≡ pi (1− γ − η1) + γ
r
Condition (52) ensures the concavity in the utility maximization program
under three constraints. We observe that the negative deﬁniteness of U entails[
ζ1 η1 − 1
] [ U11 U12
U12 U22
] [
ζ1
η1 − 1
]
< 0 (53)
A suﬃcient condition, jointly with (53), is ζ0 < 0 or, equivalently, η2 ≤
2 (η1 − 1), that is a suﬃcient degree of concavity of the credit share.26 It is also
25For simplicity, the arguments of the functions and the time subscripts are omitted.
26In the isoelastic case, the concavity of credit share is weak: η2 = η1 − 1, and ζ0 > 0.
In order to meet the second-order conditions for local maximization, we need a suﬃciently
concave utility function.
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useful to notice that the second order condition is satisﬁed under a suﬃciently
small elasticity of credit share η1, which implies ζ0 close to zero.
In the Cobb-Douglas case, ζ0 + ζ21U11 + 2ζ1 (η1 − 1)U12 + (η1 − 1)2 U22 < 0
becomes:
νη1 (η2 + 2 (1− η1)) γ
n
γ
s
< a (1− a) c1ac1−a2
[
γ + µ (1− γ − η1)
nc1
+
1− η1
c2
]2
(54)
Proof of Proposition 1
The capital-labor ratio k is determined by the golden rule r (k) = n (see
(28)). Using Assumption 3, there exists a unique solution to this equation,
k = f ′−1 (n). This also determines the real wage w (k) = w
(
f ′−1 (n)
)
= w.
Then, s is a solution of g (s) = h (s), with:
g (s) ≡ a
1− ax (s) , where x (s) ≡
ns/γ (s)
w − s/γ (s) (55)
h (s) ≡ n [1− η1 (s)]
γ (s) + µ [1− γ (s)− η1 (s)] (56)
Since the steady state is characterized by a positive bubble (b > 0), we have
s > s. Moreover, because η1 (s) < 1, s/γ (s) is increasing in s, which implies
that x (s) > 0 requires s < s. Therefore, all the stationary solutions s belong to
(s, s).27
To prove the existence of a stationary solution s, we use the continuity of
g (s) and h (s), which is ensured by γ ∈ C2 (see Assumption 1). Using (55) and
(56), we determine the boundary values of g (s) and h (s):
lims→s g (s) = a1−a
n2k
wγ(nk)−nk > 0 lims→s¯ g (s) = +∞
lims→s h (s) =
n[1−η1(nk)]
γ(nk)+µ[1−γ(nk)−η1(nk)] > 0 lims→s h (s) =
n[1−η1(s)]
γ(s)+µ[1−γ(s)−η1(s)]
where k = f ′−1 (n).
Assumption 4 ensures that lims→s g (s) < lims→s h (s), while we have lims→s¯
g (s) > lims→s¯ h (s). Therefore, there exists at least one value s∗ ∈ (s, s) such
that g (s∗) = h (s∗).
To address the uniqueness versus the multiplicity of stationary solutions s,
we compute the following elasticities:
εg (s) ≡ g
′ (s) s
g (s)
=
w [1− η1 (s)]
w − s/γ (s) > 0
εh (s) ≡ h
′ (s) s
h (s)
=
η1 (s) [ηη (s) + 1− η1 (s)]
1− η1 (s)
(µ− 1) γ (s)
γ (s) + µ [1− γ (s)− η1 (s)]
27We notice that (s, s) is nonempty. Using (10) and (18), we obtain w > s ≥ nf ′−1 (n) = s.
Because 1− η1 (s), the elasticity of s/γ (s), belongs to (0, 1), s < w implies s < s. We deduce
that s < s.
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A suﬃcient condition for uniqueness is εh (s) < εg (s) for all s ∈ (s, s). We
deduce that when γ (s) is constant (η1 (s) = 0), uniqueness is ensured because
εh (s) = 0 < εg (s).
Proof of Proposition 2
Assuming η1 constant and diﬀerentiating (29) with respect s and η1, we obtain:
εsη1 ≡
ds
dη1
η1
s
= −
(
1− η1
η1
[
η1 + (1− η1) w
s
1− η1
1− µ
1− a
a
])−1
Under (30) and Assumption 5, εsη1 > 0. According to (10), (21) and (28),
we have b =
[
s− nf ′−1 (n)] /µ and, hence, db/dη1 = (ds/dη1) /µ. We easily
conclude that b is also increasing in η1.
Proof of Proposition 3
We diﬀerentiate (29) with respect to µ and s. Using ηη = 0, we obtain:
εsµ ≡ ds
dµ
µ
s
=
µ
γ
1− γ − η1
η1 (µ− 1)− (1− η1)2 ws 1−aa
Since, under Assumption 5, the denominator of the right-hand side is strictly
negative, the proposition immediately follows.
Proof of Corollary 1
Diﬀerentiating b =
[
s− nf ′−1 (n)] /µ, we get:
εbµ ≡ db
dµ
µ
b
=
s
µb
εsµ − 1
Under Assumption 5, we easily deduce that εbµ < 0 if η1 < 1− γ.
Derivation of equation (33)
Consider the welfare functionW = U (c1, c2) and deﬁne the following elasticities:
(εWµ, εUc2 , εc2µ) ≡
(
∂W
∂µ
µ
W
,
∂U
∂c2
c2
U
,
dc2
dµ
µ
c2
)
We immediately get:
εWµ = εUc2εc2µ
(
1 + x
a
1− a
dc1/dµ
dc2/dµ
)
(57)
Diﬀerentiating now (31) and (32), we obtain:
dc1
dµ
= − (1− η1) 1
γ
ds
dµ
(58)
dc2
dµ
= n (1− η1) 1
γ
ds
dµ
(59)
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Substituting (58) and (59) in (57) and noticing that εc2µ = (1− η1) εsµ, we
get:
εWµ = εUc2εsµ (1− η1)
(
1− a
1− a
x
n
)
(60)
Equations (29) implicitly deﬁnes s as function of µ. Applying the Implicit
Function Theorem, we ﬁnd the following elasticity:
εsµ =
µ
γ
1− γ − η1
η1 (µ− 1) 1−η1+ηη1−η1 − (1− η1)
2 w
s
1−a
a
(61)
Substituting (61) in (60), we have:
εWµ = εUc2
µ
γ
(
1− x
n
a
1− a
)
1− γ − η1
(µ− 1) η11−η1
1−η1+ηη
1−η1 − (1− η1) ws 1−aa
Using the critical values µ1 and µ2, we deduce equation (33).
Proof of Proposition 4
Under Assumption 6, equation (33) implies that εWµ has the same sign of:
µ− 1
µ− µ1
1− γ − η1
µ− µ2 (62)
We note ﬁrst that under Assumption 6, we have µ2 > 1. By direct inspection
of (62), we deduce that:
1. When η1 < 1 − γ, we have µ1 < 0 and 1 < µ2. Then, εWµ > 0 for
0 < µ < 1; εWµ < 0 for 1 < µ < µ2; εWµ > 0 for µ > µ2.
2. When 1 − γ < η1, we have 1 < µ1 and 1 < µ2. Then, εWµ > 0 for
0 < µ < 1; εWµ < 0 for 1 < µ < min {µ1, µ2}; εWµ > 0 for min {µ1, µ2} <
µ < max {µ1, µ2}: εWµ < 0 for µ > max {µ1, µ2}.
Therefore, µ = 1 corresponds to a local maximum (εWµ = 0). We deduce
the proposition taking in account that µ > 1.
Proof of Lemma 2
We linearize the system (22)-(24) around a steady state (with or without bubble)
with respect to (kt, st−1, kt+1, st). We obtain:
Z2
dst
s
= εr
(
γy
1− a
a
+
1− γ
1− γ − η1Z1
)
dkt
k
+ Z1
dst−1
s
(63)
y
n
r
dkt+1
k
− n
r
dst
s
= [y − (1− y) εr] dkt
k
− dst−1
s
(64)
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where
Z1 ≡ (1− γ − η1)
[
1− a
a
+ µ
1− γ − η1
(1− γ) (1− η1)
]
Z2 ≡
(
µ− n
x
1− a
a
)(
1 +
η1ηη
1− η1
)
− µγ 1− γ − η
2
1
(1− γ) (1− η1) − γ
n
r
1− a
a
and r, εr and ηη the stationary values of r (kt), εr (kt) and ηη (st), respectively.
The characteristic polynomial is given by P (X) ≡ X2 − TX + D = 0,
where T and D represent the trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix,
respectively. After some computations, we get:
D =
1
Z2
r
n
(
Z1
[
1 + εr
y (1− γ) + (1− y) η1
y (1− γ − η1)
]
+ εrγ
1− a
a
)
(65)
T =
r
n
+
n
r
D + εr
1− y
y
(
Z1
Z2
− r
n
)
(66)
The expressions given in the lemma are obtained when y < 1, setting r = n
and using
x =
1− a
a
n (1− η1)
γ + µ (1− γ − η1)
Proof of Proposition 7
We prove that, under Assumption 7, condition (43) is suﬃcient for local inde-
terminacy, implying conditions (i)-(iii) of Proposition 6.
Assuming Z2 > 0,28 conditions (i)-(iii) for local indeterminacy in Proposi-
tion 6 are equivalent to Z1 > Z2, Z3 > 0 and
Z22 − 2
(
Z1 + 2Z3
y
1− y
)
Z2 + Z21 < 0 (67)
that is, to Z3 > 0 and 0 < Z1 − Z2 < M , where M is given by (42).
The inequality θ1 < η2 is equivalent to Z2 > 0, while the assumption γ <
1− η1 implies Z3 > 0. Since µ > 1, we have µ > 1, that is,
(1− η1) 1− η11 + η1 < γ (68)
According to 1 < µ < µ and (68), µ < µ implies 0 < Z1 − Z2, while θ2 < η2
is equivalent to Z1 − Z2 < M . Moreover, we notice that µ < µ is equivalent to
θ1 < 0 and
M > (µ− µ) 1 + η1
1− η1
[
γ − (1− η1) 1− η11 + η1
]
(69)
which is satisﬁed for µ suﬃciently close to µ, entails θ2 < 0.
28Conditions (i)-(iii) of Proposition 6 are no longer met when Z2 < 0.
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